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Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 77, Folder 3, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
F 0 R R E L E A S E 0 N 
REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA) 
at the 
CONVOCATION 
MEMORIAL GYMNASIUM 
Sunday, February 11, 1968 
8:00p.m., e.s.t. 
VIET NAM 
My remarks, today, deal with Viet Nam. Before 
proceeding to them, however, I wish to refer to the USS Pueblo 
incident. When added to the Vietnamese conflict, it is illustra-
tive of the hydra-headed character of military involvement on 
the mainland of Asia. War spreads readily on that continent; 
the difficulty lies in curbing it. I would emphaEize, therefore, 
that while the urgency in Viet Nam is to bring one bloody conflict 
to a close, the imperative in Korea is to prevent the opening 
of another. 
In the latter connection, it will help to bear in 
mind the essentials of the Pueblo affair. A U. s. vessel--that 
it was an electronic listener of some sort is not disputed--was 
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in a position off the North Korean coast. What vital national 
need prompted the dispatch of this particular 
nt,:!n. 
mission or why the 
vessel went undefended are 
All reports available to me indicate that the 
Pueblo was in international waters at the time it was taken. 
As of the moment, the Pueblo is now at anchor in Wonsan harbor 
and the 82 surviving crewmen who were aboard--one other has 
died--are interned in North Korea. That ineluctable fact is 
in no way altered by a sense of outrage or indignation. 
The crew aboard the Pueblo was carrying out a 
dangerous assignment. The "why" and the "how" of the mission 
are moot at this point. What matters now is the obligation to 
those men. In our reactions to the Pueblo affair, lives must 
not become the pawns of either pride or petulance. Every effort 
to bring about their release must be made. 
We will also do well to bear in mind that the one 
war in which we are engaged on the Asian mainland has become a 
source of immense grief. Any move which leads into a second 
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Vietnamese-type conflict in Korea will compound the grief but 
hardly serve the interests of this nation. 
In sum, what most matters at this point, it seems 
to me, is: (1) return of the 80-odd American crewmen· alive--
I repeat, alive--and; (2) prevention of a second war in Korea 
on the pattern of Viet Nam which could the more readily become 
World War III. 
The firm restraint which President Johnson has 
exercised from the outset of the Pueblo affair has set a wise 
course for this nation. The question has been raised at the 
United Nations Security Council by Ambassador Arthur Goldberg. 
It has been pursued at the Panmunjom truce site in discussions 
between our representatives and those of North Korea. ·· Other 
channels are also being tapped which might lead to the release 
of the crewmen. In short, the President's policy at this time 
is to seek a solution by diplomacy. It is the course of prudence 
and reason in what is, at best, a delicate and dangerous situa-
tion . It deserves every support of the nation. 
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T~ere is no certainty that the present efforts 
will bear fruit. Other possibilities, however, may also be 
available. I would point out, for example, that, if necessary, 
the matter should be pressed further at the United Nations which 
has had a definite responsibility in Korea for almost two decades 
If it comes to that, it may be feasible to seek impartial arbi-
tration or mediation or a presentation of the entire matter t o 
the World Court. May I say that precedent for the latter proce-
dure is to be found in a similar dispute two decades ago over 
the loss of two British destroyers off the Albanian Coast. 
vfuatever the specific recourse, in my judgment, 
the efforts to find a peaceful solution in the Pueblo affair 
are attuned to this nation's interest. vfuat matters in my 
judgment is saving lives, not saving face. ~~at matters is 
the substance not the shadow of this nation's interests. 
That is true in Korea; and it is no less true in 
VietNam. The nation's interests in VietNam, in my judgment, 
lie in bringing the war to an honorable conclusion at the 
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earliest possible moment. The pursuit of a negotiated solution 
was right for this nation before the recent coordinated offen-
sives in the South Vietnamese cities. It is right today, while 
that offensive continues in certain areas and when a second 
offensive may be on the verge of opening, if not in Khe Sanh, 
somewhere else in the remote highlands of central Viet Nam. 
Insofar as I can see, negotiations a re and have 
always been the only rational alternative in this situation to 
an indefinite U. S. involvement on the Southeast Asian mai nland. 
Two years ago I joined four Senate colleagues, including Senator 
Muskie, in a report at the CJnclusion of a visit to Southeast 
Asia . Our principal observat ion, then, was that the Ameri can 
position i n Viet Nam had the character of "pressing against a 
military s ituation whi ch is, in effect, open-ended." We added 
this c omment:"How open is dependent on the extent to which North 
Viet Nam and its supporters are willing and able to meet ~r.cre~~~ 
i ncreased f o rce by increased force ." It i s more apparent now 
than it was at the t ime that the war is open-ended . How open 
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may be uncertain--in my judgment it is still wide open--but in 
any event, to date, the NLF and the North Vietnamese have been 
both able and willing to meet increased force with increased 
force. 
At the beginning of 1966, the United States already 
had 180,000 men in Viet Nam. American forces directly involved 
in the war have since tripled to something approaching 600,000--
with over 500,000 on the ground in Viet Nam and the others serv-
ing the war from elsewhere in the region. Total American casual-
ties have gone well past 100,000. Last year's toll of those 
< /'U a. t;_ 
killed i n action showed a ... B~ fold- i ncrease in two years, from 
1,964 in 1965 to 9,353 in 1967. 
This increase i n the American military effort has 
been met by increases i n the North Vietnamese-NLF effort; their 
casualties, too, have increased greatly. The war, in short, 
has risen over the past three years to ever higher intensities 
of destructiveness. The bas ic juxtaposition in Viet Nam, however 
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has not been altered as anticipated. In the spring of 1965, the 
all-consuming objective of the American effort was to prevent 
the collapse of a government with which we had allied ourselves . 
Almost three years later, countless thousands of lives later, 
and tens of billions of dollars later, that is still the 
objective. 
One can put whatever interpretation one chooses 
on the recent events in Viet Nam. To me, however, they suggest 
that the survival of the Saigon political structure, in its 
present form, may now be more uncertain. The pacification 
program appears to have gone the route of at least a dozen prior 
schemes for "winning the people'' by providing them with security 
and a stake i n the structure. The cities of South Viet Nam 
which have heretofore been spared most of the ravage s of the war, 
almost by tacit understanding, have now been drawn into the 
vortex of its terrible devastation. If there is an alternative 
to chaos in what has heretofore been the core of the government's 
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strength, it will lie in yet another costly task of reconstruc-
tion and rehabilitation whjch can hardly be borne by the South 
Vietnamese government. 
What is now clear is that no part of South Viet 
Nam is secure for anyone. The hamlets, villages, and the cities 
of Viet Nam are seen to be honeycombed with a NLF infrastructure 
which has undoubtedly existed for many years, which is still 
intact and which may well be stronger than ever. 
It is possible to point to one-sided casualty 
figures and to echo one-sided words of reassurance. If we are 
interested in saving lives rather than saving face, however, I 
think we will find the realism to confront the implications of 
the present situation. The Saigon political structure is no 
stronger today than it was three years ago in the sense of being 
able on its own to govern, to defend or to rally the people of 
South Viet Nam. Indeed, its very survival now appears more 
dependent upon American military power than at any time in the 
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paat. In short, once again there is not the beginnings of a 
beginning of a stable political situation in South Viet Nam. 
That such is the case, in no way reflects on the 
courage or the competence of the military forces which have 
carried the burden of combat in Viet Nam for many months. In 
statistical terms, these forces have been immensely effective. 
They have won major engagement after engagement. The figures 
say that over 87,000 enemy troops were killed last year, that 
another 27,000 have crossed over to the government side and that 
countless thousands were captured or were otherwise put out of 
action. Naval and air power have pounded so much of North Viet 
Nam into rubble that there are left unscathed scarcely any 
military or industr ial targets. 
Nevertheless, for the kind of war which is being 
fought in South Viet Nam, the forces in opposition continue to 
obtain adequate and, apparently, ever more sophisticated mili-
tary supplies over the infiltration routes from the North. The 
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NLF remains omnipresent, from the demilitarized zone at the 
17th parallel to the Mekong Delta and i ts regular forces and 
guerillas are steeled to accept great privation and to make 
enormous sacrifices. The Viet Cong remain entrenched and vir-
tually untouched in their traditional strongholds--the swamps, 
paddy-fields and hamlets of the Mekong Delta--from whence they 
are now seen to be able to dispatch forces to Saigon and other 
cities. North Viet Nam has committed to the war in the South 
considerably less than a quarter of the well-trained forces of 
General Giap. And beyond North Viet Nam lies the untapped 
manpower of China and the supply sources of both China and the 
Soviet Union. 
These are some of the reali ties whj_ch the com-
puters of 11 progress" in this war do not measure. These are 
some of the realities which urge us to recall the original 
purposes for wh i ch the nation was committed to South Viet Nam. 
They were, above all, limited purposes. We went into Viet Nam 
not to take over a war but on the assumption that we were 
summoned to aid the people of South Viet Nam. 
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From the outset, it was not an American responsi-
bility and it is not now an American responsibility to win a 
victory for any particular Vietnamese group, or to defeat any 
particular Vietnamese group. It was not then and it is not now 
an American function to insure that any political structure 
shall be enshrined over the smoldering ruins of a devastated 
Viet Nam. Even if we could, we should not seek to synthesize 
a government or system for South Viet Nam. That is not the 
responsibility of the American military command, the American 
economists and the American political scientists who are 
gathered in Saigon. That is a responsibility which can only 
be exercised by the Vietnamese people themselves. The sooner 
that the limits of our commitment are recognized by all 
directly concerned, therefore, the better for all concerned. 
We need to face the probability, bluntly, that 
the build-up of the American involvement, in its very 
immensity, may well have already extended the role of this 
nation beyond those limits. In so doing, it may not be aiding--
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as it was i ntended--to resolve the s ituation in accord with the 
wishes of the people of South Viet Nam. It is apparent, for 
example, that the more that U. S. forces have taken the major 
combat role, the slacker have been the efforts of the allied 
indigenous forces. It is apparent, too, that a massive U. S. 
technological presence in South Viet Nam has exerted a revolu-
tionary impact on the whole of the fabric of traditional 
Vietnamese society. 
In a physical sense, the crushing weight of 
modern warfare has fallen not only on the Viet Cong--the NLF--
and the North Vietnamese but on all Vietnamese. The terrible 
cost in lives and property throughout Viet Nam is borne by 
Vietnamese of all political colors. 
Our immense effort, in short, has gone a long way 
in altering the character of what was once an inner struggle 
among Vietnamese. In the end, however, the future of Viet Nam 
must depend on the Vietnamese themselves. It is their country; 
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they live i n it. They will be living in it long after we are 
gone from it. 
Our commitment is to support, not to submerge. 
To strip the Vietnamese struggle of its Vietnamese character, 
to convert it into a war to be won or lost by this nation, 
detracts from its relevance both to the people of Viet Nam and 
to the people of the United States. To do so is to consolidate 
an American involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland of j_nde-
f i nite duration and obscure purpose whose terminus is not 
visible--not in Viet Nam, not in Laos, or in Cambodia. Indeed, 
i t may well be an involvement which is without exit except in 
World War III. 
This nation is deeply committed in South Viet Nam 
but let us not make the mistake of interpreting that commitment 
as compelling us-- i n the name of victory or whatever--to see to 
it that every last member of the NLF is either dulled, dead, or 
fleeing to the North, and that North Viet Nam has been bombed 
back into the Stone Age. That course leads not to an ending but 
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to an endless succession of vjolent beginnings. An interminable 
involvement of American forces may meet the desires of some in 
Viet Nam or of some other nation, but that course does not 
accord with the substance of the interests of the United States. 
President Johnson has repeatedly stated that this 
nation's objective is " ... only that the people of South VietNam 
be allowed to guide their own country in their own way." He 
has stated that he is w5.lling to move at any time in negotiationr 
which might bring about that result. 
It should be made clear to all concerned--Ameri-
cans and Vietnamese--that that is the extent of this nation's 
commitment. The commitment is to all of the people of South 
Viet Nam. We have no obligation to continue to pour out the 
blood and resources of this nation until South Viet Nam is 
made safe for one faction or another. 
Indeed, in my judgment, there is little prospect 
of meeting our actual commitment to the people o f Viet Nam in 
the visible future unless there is a prompt restoration of 
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peace. On that basis, every avenue--in the United Nations or 
elsewhere--should continue to be explored in an effort to reach 
an honorable conclusion. In so doing, this nation needs no 
sanction or approval from any group, leader, or whomever in 
Viet Nam or anywhere else. 
In the hope of bringing about a peaceful settle-
ment without adding to the burdens of the American forces in 
the south, I have joined Senator Cooper and others in urging 
that the bombing of North Viet Nam be restricted to the infil-
tration routes at the 17th parallel. I am frank to say, however 
that while it may well result in negotiations, I am not at all 
sure that a cessation of the bombing is the critical factor in 
bringing this war to an honorable conclusion. More important, 
in my judgment, is the framework in which the war in Viet Nam 
is seen and within which its conclusion is negotiated. It is 
doubtful that there is a basis for fruitful negotiations if 
the conflict is defined as a simple case of aggression on the 
part of the North against the South. The reality is far more 
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complex, far more subtle. That is true insofar as the relation-
ship between North and South Viet Nam is concerned. It is true 
insofar as the relationship of the various groups and elements 
within SouthViet Nam is concerned. The government in Saigon, 
as it is presently constituted continues to be run by a faction 
of military officers--indeed, most of whom are northerners--
and they are by no means the whole political coin. There are 
other grJups of southern Vietnamese who must be taken more into 
consideration if there is to be an end to the bloodshed in the 
foreseeable future. These groups include not only those within 
the Nat;onal Liberation Front but elements wh · ch are now without 
significant voice in either camp. 
A negotiated solution, if there is to be one, may 
well involve preliminary discussions among the political, reli-
gous, and sectarian groups, as well as the ruling military group, 
which are to be found under the Saigon structure. If there can 
be some common agreement among them to seek a settlement of the 
war, it is at least conceivable that there could then be 
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discussions with the National Liberation Front. Needless to 
say, such discussions can hardly take place if the Saigon govern· 
ment regards even words of compromise as treasonable. 
If the door could be opened to peace-talks among 
the South Vietnamese themselves, one would hope that it would 
make easier the opening of doors to negotiat i ons between this 
nation and North Viet Nam and among all the nations directly or 
indirectly concerned in the conflict. A basis might then be 
laid for applying the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 in deter-
mining the future relationship of the two parts of Viet Nam and 
for guaranteeing the neutralization of Viet Nam and all of Indo-
China. May I add it does not much matter whether such discus-
sions are held under United Nations auspices or in Geneva, or 
in some other appropriate forum. What is necessary is that 
they encompass all who are closely involved, including China, 
if there is to be a durable peace in V~ Nam and Indo-China. 
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I do not know whether there are any greater 
prospects for progress towards peace i n this approach than 
in the countless others whi ch have been suggested. I believe , 
however, that unless there is the beginni ng of a negotiated 
peace, the f i res of war in Viet Nam will blaze ever more 
fiercely. They will spread further and further, leaving 
ever wider arcs of a piteous wreckage. And if the fires 
burn out of control to World War III, what nation will 
claim the victory? Indeed, what nation will be left to 
claim it? 
